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Abstract
It has long been known that several popular default and conditional logics exactly describe
infinitesimal probability constructs which betoken virtual certainty regarding the truth of one
sentence if some other sentence is true. That the rules for default inference also describe a scheme
of approximate inference for all positive-valued conditional probabilities has also long been known.
More recently, a class of standard probability measures has been found whose expression of more
likely than not is exactly described by default rules. This class can be extended by straightforward
algebra so that the range of confidence levels expressed by standard probability distributions which
are exactly described by the rules is as complete as for the approximate methods. Ó 1999 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Building on the investigations of Adams [1], Pearl [9] reported that a variety of systems
for nonmonotonic reasoning could be understood as descriptions of the behavior of
nonstandard probabilistic relationships
p(B|A)= 1− ε,
where ε is infinitesimally greater than zero. In other words, the nonmonotonic formalisms
were seen as depicting a state of mind which could be characterized as near certainty about
the truth of B if A were known or assumed to be true.
1 Email: paulsnow@delphi.com.
0004-3702/99/$ – see front matter Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0004-3702(99)0 00 54 -5
270 P. Snow / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 269–279
At the time, it was thought that no standard probability distributions, that is, measures
which assign specific real numbers to each sentence, were described by the rules
characteristic of nonmonotonic inference. This was because nonmonotonic systems feature
rules like
if A is preferred to B and A is preferred to C, then A is preferred to B ∨C
and yet in standard probability distributions, the value assigned to B ∨C is usually greater
than that enjoyed by either disjunct. This property is called additivity. It is entirely typical
of standard probabilities, then, that
A is more likely than B and than C, but B ∨C may be more likely than A.
The role of standard probability in the discussion of the semantics of popular default
schemata thus seemed restricted to a second, approximate kind of relationship between
probabilities and default reasoning. This relationship was also discussed by Pearl [9],
again building on Adams [1]. If the premises of a default argument were interpreted as
statements that certain conditional probabilities were to some unspecified degree “high”,
then conclusions derived through the rules for default reasoning would also correspond to
“high” conditional probabilities. For example, the well-known And rule,
If A |∼B and A |∼C, then A |∼B ∧C
could be read as the generalization
If p(B|A) and p(C|A) are “high”, then p(B ∧C|A) is also “high”.
All probabilities are eligible for this interpretation, but the conclusion probability would
not generally be as great as the premise probabilities. There has been considerable interest
in quantifying the bounds-propagation behavior of default rules, such as the work of
Hawthorne [7], Bourne and Parsons [3], and Schurz [10,11].
It turns out that standard probability distributions do exist which despite their additivity
nevertheless express more likely than not in a way which is described by the rules of default
entailment. That is, for these distributions, the conditional expression A |∼ B corresponds
to
p(B|A) > 0.5.
The existence of such distributions was shown by Wong [15]. The particular distributions
in question were originally identified in a different context from nonmonotonic reason-
ing [13], but their application to that domain was made in due course. The probability
measures are solutions of a type of simultaneous algebraic constraints called atomic bound
systems. These systems include infinitesimal constructs as limiting-case solutions.
In [11], Schurz remarked that atomic bound systems were restricted in their expressive-
ness compared to the ability of the second kind of semantics to use as premises conditional
probabilities of any value. The purpose of the present paper is to explore this class of prob-
ability distributions whose expressions of confidence are described by default rules despite
additivity. The available probability bounds do subtend the full range of positive values,
corresponding to interpretations ranging from not impossible to nearly certain. Through-
out the paper, system P [8] will be emphasized as a specific instance of the large class of
conditional logics which participate in a probabilistic semantics of this kind.
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2. Assumptions and system P
We assume that the domain over which probabilities are defined consists of a finite
number of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive atomic sentences. All other
sentences in the deductive closure of the atoms may be represented as the disjunction of
zero or more atoms. The empty disjunction, denoted by ∅, and only the empty disjunction,
will be equated with certain falsehood, and correspondingly throughout the paper zero
probability will be assumed to be assigned only to sentences which are logical falsehoods.
The following suite of properties for the Kraus et al. [8] default entailment connective
“|∼” constitute system P, or preferential entailment.
Right Weakening. If B⇒ C and A |∼B , then A |∼C.
Reflexivity. A |∼A.
Left Logical Equivalence. If A⇔B , and A |∼C, then B |∼C.
Cut. If A |∼B , and A∧B |∼C, then A |∼C.
Cautious Monotonicity. If A |∼B and A |∼C, then A∧B |∼C.
Or. If A |∼C and B |∼C, then A∨B |∼C.
A frequently used consequence of these inference rules is
And. If A |∼B and A |∼C, then A |∼B ∧C.
In addition, the authors endorsed an additional property, which we shall call
Privileged False. If A |∼ ∅, then A⇒∅.
Although this is not a required feature of system P, if A |∼ ∅, then by Right Weakening,
A entails any sentence in the domain, including its own negation, which is neither intuitive
nor useful unless A were false. Consequently, we shall assume throughout this discussion
that Privileged False holds. Note that And and Privileged False immediately imply
Discernment. If A |∼B , then not (A |∼ ¬B), or A⇒∅.
In seeking a meaning for preferential entailment, whether or not a “probabilistic”
meaning, it is helpful to consider that every entailment expression asserts a preference
between two exclusive sentences. Specifically,
A |∼B if and only if (A∧B)∨ (A∧¬B) |∼ (A∧B). (1)
This commonplace of default reasoning is easily demonstrated from the first four properties
in the list which begins this section.
Expression (1) is a formal version of the frequently encountered and common-sensical
interpretation of A |∼ B as “if A is assumed, then B is normal”. It might also be read
“if A is assumed, then B is more normal than not B”. If a specifically probabilistic
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interpretation were sought, then one might go on to wonder whether or not there exist
probability distributions p( ) defined over the sentences so that
A |∼B if and only if p(A∧B) > p(A∧¬B), or A⇒∅. (2)
In words, are there probability distributions where the expressions of preference revealed
by (1) manifest themselves as differences in probability values, where “more normal”
corresponds to higher probability? If so, then the strict rather than weak inequality which
appears in (2) is required to achieve Discernment.
If one prefers a conditional probability formulation, then for nonfalseA, we may rewrite
(2) as
A |∼B if and only if p(B|A) > p(¬B|A)
since
p(B|A)= p(A∧B)/p(A) and p(¬B|A)= p(A∧¬B)/p(A)
and p(A) is greater than zero by assumption. We may further rewrite (1) as
A |∼B if and only if p(B|A) > 0.5
since all probabilities are nonnegative and respect total probability:
p(B|A)+ p(¬B|A)= 1.
3. Atomic bound probabilities
This section characterizes the probabilities which can be used in (2). Throughout this
section and the next, we shall assume that there is a complete default ordering of the atoms,
that is, for all distinct atoms a and b,
a ∨ b |∼ a or else a ∨ b |∼ b
and that this ordering is transitive,
if a ∨ b |∼ a and b ∨ c |∼ b, then a ∨ c |∼ a.
Transitivity is a required feature of system P [8]. Complete ordering is not a feature of
system P, but since probability distributions completely order their domains, compliance
with (2) requires complete ordering. Complete ordering is also a venerable special case of
“ordered possible worlds” found, for instance, in the pioneering work of Shoham [12].
Complete ordering of the atoms has the effect that all pairs of exclusive sentences are
also default-ordered. This is because every nonempty sentence A has exactly one “top
atom” a, for which
a⇒A, and a ∨ a′ |∼ a for all atoms a′ ⇒A
and so by application of Or, A |∼ a. If sentence B is exclusive of A, with top atom b, then
a ∨ b |∼ a if and only if A∨B |∼A. (3)
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This “only if” part can be shown by the transitivity of the atomic ordering, and the
application of Or and Right Weakening. The “if” part follows from the completeness of
the ordering, Right Weakening, and Discernment.
Preferential entailment can thus be viewed as identifying where the overall top atom
resides within the disjunction of the sentences being compared. Complete ordering of the
exclusive sentences may be convenient semantically, since then there is a default choice
between any pair of alternatives, which comports with the spirit of default reasoning.
At the 1991 IJCAI, Dubois and Prade [5] reported that default reasoning formalisms,
among them system P, could be modeled using the possibility calculus. Possibility assigns
to each atom in the domain a value in the closed unit interval. Disjunctive sentences in the
domain receive the possibility value
Π(A)=max
a⇒AΠ(a). (4)
That is, the possibility value of a disjunction is the highest possibility value enjoyed by
any of its atomic disjuncts. Expression (4) leads to the following computationally efficient
comparison rule. If a is the highest possibility atom in A, and b is the highest possibility
atom in B , then
Π(A) >Π(B) if and only if Π(a) >Π(b). (5)
Within that framework, Dubois and Prade proved that one may interpret default entailment
as
A |∼B if and only if Π(A∧B) >Π(A∧¬B) (6)
for nonfalse A. Possibility’s maximum rule (4) obviously discloses the whereabouts of the
top atom among the sentences being compared, leading through (5) to (6).
At the 1994 AAAI, a class of probability distributions was introduced which are the
solutions of a set of simultaneous algebraic constraints, each of which is a lower bound on
the probability of an atom [13]. In its strict inequality version, the typical constraint is
p(a) >
∑
b: p(b)<p(a)
p(b).
In words, the probability assigned to any atom is greater than the sum of the probabilities
assigned to any inferior atom. These inequalities, when combined with the requirement
that the probability of the least likely atom be strictly positive and with the usual total
probability constraint, have come to be called atomic bound systems. Atomic bound
systems are always consistent, i.e., the probabilities so described actually exist. An example
of such a distribution can be constructed from the successive powers of 2, such as for five
atoms
(1/31,2/31,4/31,8/31,16/31).
Atomic bound solutions also participate in a computationally efficient strict inequality
comparison rule, analogous to that for possibilities, expression (5). If the atoms are
completely and strictly ordered, A and B are disjoint, a is the highest probability atom
in A, and b is the highest probability atom in B , then
p(A) > p(B) if and only if p(a) > p(b) (7)
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since the typical constraint ensures that p(a) by itself is greater than p(B), and p(A) is
no smaller than p(a). The same reasoning shows that if the order of the top atoms were
reversed, then the order of the disjunctions would be, too.
Comparing (5) and (7), it is clear that default entailment can be modeled using atomic
bound solutions according to the following schema for nonfalse A:
A |∼B if and only if p(A∧B) > p(A∧¬B). (8)
The proof is by the same arguments used for (6). These results were communicated in
conference literature in 1996 [14], and have since been applied by Benferhat et al. [2] to
their own theory of acceptance functions [6].
Other formal reasoning systems popular in AI and allied disciplines exist whose
interpretation also involves comparing the merits of two sentences by locating where
their top atoms reside. Still other systems rely on locating top atoms in logically related
sentences, as in Dubois and Prade’s model of epistemic entrenchment [4].
From the analysis of this section, it is easy to see that every solution of the atomic bound
system whose typical constraint is
p(a) >
∑
b: Π(b)<Π(a)
p(b)
agrees ordinally with all possibilistic strict inequalities
Π(A) >Π(B)⇒ p(A) > p(B).
Atomic bound systems thus provide a standard probabilistic semantics, involving a
special family of probability distributions, for the orderings typical of many “nonadditive”
reasoning systems.
The section concludes with the observation that atomic bound systems exhaust the
probabilities that satisfy (2).
Proposition. The solutions of the atomic bound system with typical constraint
p(a) >
∑
b 6=a: a∨b|∼a
p(b),
are the only probability distributions for which
A |∼B and A is not false implies p(A∧B) > p(A∧¬B)
when (3) holds.
Proof. In order not to be a solution of the atomic bound system, p( ) must violate a
constraint, so there must be some atom a where
p(a)6
∑
b 6=a: a∨b|∼a
p(b)= p(B),
where B is the disjunction of the atoms inferior to a. However, for each atom b in B ,
a ∨ b |∼ a, so a ∨B |∼ a by Or, but it is not the case that p(a) > p(B). 2
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Only specialized probabilities exhibit the kind of ordinal behavior which can be
described by system P. A wider range of probabilities, however, exhibit conditional bounds
which can be related to default entailment. This is discussed in the next section.
4. Diverse degrees of confidence
There are probability distributions which permit A |∼B for nonfalse A to be interpreted
as
p(B|A)> x,
where x is any positive number less than unity. This lower bound expression is equivalent
to
p(B|A)> x[p(B|A)+ p(¬B|A)]
by total probability, hence
p(B|A)> [x/(1− x)]p(¬B|A).
For simplicity, let y be the ratio in brackets, and note that it is positive and increasing in x .
After dividing through by p(A), which is assumed to be positive, we have
p(B ∧A)> yp(¬B ∧A), y > 0. (9)
Consider the following lower bound constraint applied to ordered atoms:
p(a)> y
∑
b 6=a: a∨b|∼a
p(b), y > 0. (10)
The use of weak inequality in (9) and (10) reflects notational convenience. The objective
of the preceding section was to characterize the largest set which complies with (2), and
that set does not include some boundary points of the set defined by (10) with y = 1. In the
present section, no purpose is served in making such a distinction. We continue to assume
that atomic probabilities are strictly greater than zero, however.
Whenever y is strictly greater than unity, it is straightforward to show that solutions exist
by generalizing the base two integer representation result, since for all natural numbers n
(n+ 1)k > n∗
∑
i=0 to k−1
(n+ 1)i .
Thus, for any finite y greater than 1, a solution can be formed by choosing the next higher
integer for n. The solutions form a subset of the atomic bound solutions discussed in
the preceding section. Any solution asserts both a strict ordering between any pair of
exclusive sentences, as well as a bound on the ratio of their probabilities. Infinitesimal-
based nonstandard probabilities in the style of Pearl [9] can be viewed simply as some
of the solutions near one chosen vertex of the convex hull of the ordinary atomic bound
solution set.
When y is unity or less, solutions also always exist. One has relaxed the previous
section’s strict atomic bound constraints, whose solutions form a subset of the relaxed
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system’s solutions. The interpretation given to the default entailment rules changes
somewhat. If p(B|A) is one-half or less, then p(¬B|A)> p(B|A), and so it is impossible
to have for nonfalse A
A |∼B if and only if p(B|A)> x
since p(¬B|A) would also be at least x , leading to A |∼ ¬B , contrary to Discernment.
For individual solutions, the entailment rules imply bounds on only some of the relevant
conditional probabilities which are solutions of the system whose typical constraint is (10),
i.e., for nonfalse A
A |∼B only if p(B|A)> x, (11)
when x is less than or equal to one-half. Expression (11) becomes a bound on the
proportion between the relevant joint probabilities, rather than their order, when the
conditional bound is rewritten in the form of (9).
Whichever positive y is chosen, solutions of systems whose typical constraint is in the
form of (10) are the only probability distributions where A |∼ B implies (9) for nonfalse
A when exclusive sentences are completely ordered. The proof is dual to that of the
proposition of the preceding section, obtained by substituting the symbols “> y” for “>”
and “< y” for “6” throughout the earlier proof.
For the entire set of solutions of the constraint system for any positive y , there is an
interpretation involving full equivalence. If the atoms are completely default-ordered, then
for solutions of simultaneous constraints in the form of (10) and nonfalse A,
A |∼B if and only if p(A∧B)> yp(A∧¬B),
in all solutions of the constraints. (12)
The “only if” part has already been discussed. When y 6 1, the “if” follows from all the
solutions of a strict atomic bound system of Section 3 being a subset of the solutions of
the relaxed system. Within that subset, there is a global positive lower bound on the ratio
p(A ∧ B)/p(A ∧ ¬B) just in case that the top atom in A is also in B . In the solutions
near the hull vertex where A’s top atom is maximal, lesser atoms have vanishingly small
probability. Complete strict ordering arguments show that (12) also holds for a choice of y
which is greater than one.
The existence of probability ratio interpretations of default entailments based on atomic
proportional bounds does not depend on any narrow choice of bounding value. Any positive
value for y will serve, and any probability distribution which is free of zeroes except for
falsehood satisfies (10) for small enough y .
5. Partial default orders
Apart from relaxations of the atomic bound systems based on the degree of confidence
which one desires to express, one could also drop the assumption that possible worlds are
completely default-ordered. Suppose the givens of a problem are a complete weak scalar
ordering of some atoms, such as a possibility distribution. Any strict atomic orderings
are interpreted as default rankings, and those are the only atomic default rankings. One
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resolves that all other default entailments which can be derived from the atomic defaults
according to the rules of system P obtain.
Under this resolution, an entailment is asserted just when one alternative sentence
contains all of the highest-rank atoms in the disjunction of the sentences being compared.
The proof for this uncontroversial conclusion can be constructed chiefly from successive
applications of Cut and Cautious Monotonicity. One may use the possibilistic rule (3)
for deriving inferences, comparing any highest-rank atom from each of the alternatives in
question. For disjoint A and B ,
If a is any highest-rank atom in A and b is any highest-rank atom in B,
then A∨B |∼A if and only if a ∨ b |∼ a.
Probabilistic constraint systems can be built from (10) for a chosen y . The rank of
an atom is expressed by the number of distinct atoms which appear in the summation,
atoms of the same rank having the same lower bound summation. Solutions exist since
the constraints are never stronger than in a complete system with the same y , and the
complete system always has solutions. Satisfaction of the constraints and the highest-rank
atom inference rule ensures that for nonfalse A
A |∼B only if p(A∧B)> yp(A∧¬B) (13)
for any solution. The solution set as a whole obeys for nonfalse A,
A |∼B if and only if p(A∧B)> yp(A∧¬B),
in all solutions of the constraints.
The “if” part in this case follows from the absence of equality constraints in the atomic
bound specification, leaving each highest-rank atom in two unordered exclusive sentences
free to assume arbitrarily close-to-unity values when the sentences are conditioned on their
disjunction. Thus, solutions consistent with either sense of the inequality are present except
when entailment actually holds and only one sentence has an overall highest-rank atom.
Members of the solution set are the only probabilities to obey (13) for all A |∼ B , by the
same arguments used to prove the proposition of Section 3.
The free choice of a positive probability ratio for an interpretation of default entailments
does not require that exclusive sentences be completely default ordered. Partial orders also
permit such interpretations and allow default inferences to be made using the efficient
methods which locate the highest-rank atoms in sentences being compared.
6. More general premises
In many problems, one might be given a set of conditional expressions involving
arbitrary sentences, rather than an ordering of the atoms. There might neither be the need
for, nor any real interest in, examining the possible worlds themselves nor in any variety of
possible worlds semantics. Instead, a probabilist might be interested solely in the bounds-
propagation properties of the default rules for general conditional probabilities which were
discussed in the Introduction, rather than the kind of interpretations explored throughout
most of the paper.
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Nevertheless, if the premises of a problem are arbitrary default expressions, there may
be one or more complete atomic default orderings which are consistent with them. As
explained in [2], checking this condition is similar to checking a set of formulas for
the absence of classical inconsistency. When there are any such complete atomic default
orderings, the family of atomic bound systems which can be constructed from them
displays an interesting feature.
Proposition 13 of [2] stated that an entailmentA |∼B for nonfalseA follows from a set of
premises using the rules of system P if and only if p(A∧B) > p(A∧¬B) in all solutions of
all completely ordered strict atomic bound systems which are consistent with the premises.
The latter ordinal condition can be replaced by a statement about proportional bounds to
yield a parallel proposition. The replacement condition is that p(A ∧ B) > yp(A ∧ ¬B)
among all solutions of all sets of systems of complete atomic proportional bounds which
are consistent with the same premises and whose typical constraint is (10) for any chosen
positive value of y .
There is an obvious one-to-one correspondence between any such system and an
ordinal atomic bound system expressing the same complete atomic ranking. Comparing (8)
and (12), it is immediate that for any pair of corresponding systems, p(A ∧ B) >
p(A ∧ ¬B) in all solutions of the ordinal system just when p(A ∧ B) > yp(A∧ ¬B) in
all solutions of its correspondent. So, ordinal unanimity among any set of strict atomic
bound systems coincides exactly with unanimous proportional bounding in the set of
corresponding systems.
Note that the partial default orderings of atoms discussed in the previous section have
consistent complete orderings. One simply breaks the atomic ties however one wishes.
Thus, this enhancement of Proposition 13 of [2] applies to them.
Atomic bound systems can collectively recover the inferences of system P for consistent
premises. The same ability is also exhibited by related systems expressing other confidence
levels by proportional bounds.
7. Conclusions
The results in this paper have concerned formal systems whose behavior is described
by system P and an ordered possible world semantics. Within that semantics, preferential
entailment based on ranked atoms describes accurately and completely some standard-
probability ratio bounds between exclusive sentences. Those bounds are unanimous among
the solutions of simultaneous inequality systems whose typical constraint takes the form
p(a)> y
∑
b 6=a: a∨b|∼a
p(b), y > 0.
Zero is excluded since the desirable feature of Discernment would have no representation
in that case.
All positive values of y correspond to some guaranteed level of confidence or lower
bound on conditional probabilities, with meanings of at least “somewhat possible”. As y
surpasses a value of one, the reading shifts to “more likely than not”, and for a complete
default ordering of the atoms, there is a selection of single probability distributions, each of
P. Snow / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 269–279 279
which is in exact ordinal agreement with entailment. As y increases further, more stringent
interpretations can be expressed, such as “extremely likely”, and when y approaches
infinity in the limit, we encounter the infinitesimal-based realm of “virtual certainty”.
The ability of probability to furnish formal systems whose proportional behavior
faithfully mimics the rules of default reasoning does not require any special degree of
confidence. The mitigation of additivity displayed by atomic bound solutions and their
close algebraic relatives suffices.
References
[1] E. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975.
[2] S. Benferhat, D. Dubois, H. Prade, Possibilistic and standard probabilistic semantics of conditional
knowledge, in: Proc. AAAI-97, Providence, RI, 1997, pp. 70–75.
[3] R. Bourne, S. Parsons, Propagating probabilities in system P, in: D.J. Cook (Ed.), Proc. Florida Artificial
Intelligence Research Symposium, AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA, 1998, pp. 440–445.
[4] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Epistemic entrenchment and possibilistic logic, Artificial Intelligence 50 (1991) 223–
239.
[5] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Possibilistic logic, preferential models, nonmonotonicity, and related issues, in: Proc.
IJCAI-91, Sydney, Australia, 1991, pp. 419–424.
[6] D. Dubois, H. Prade, Numerical representations of acceptance, in: P. Besnard, S. Hanks (Eds.), Uncertainty
in Artificial Intelligence, Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA, 1995, pp. 149–156.
[7] J. Hawthorne, On the logic of nonmonotonic conditionals and conditional probabilities, J. Philos. Logic 25
(1996) 185–218.
[8] S. Kraus, D. Lehmann, M. Magidor, Nonmonotonic logic, preferential models and cumulative logics,
Artificial Intelligence 44 (1990) 167–207.
[9] J. Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference, Morgan
Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988.
[10] G. Schurz, Probabilistic default logic based on irrelevance and relevance assumptions, in: D. Gabbay et al.
(Eds.), Qualitative and Quantitative Practical Reasoning, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1244,
Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 536–553.
[11] G. Schurz, Probabilistic semantics for Delgrande’s conditional logic and a counterexample to his default
logic, Artificial Intelligence 102 (1998) 81–95.
[12] Y. Shoham, Reasoning about Change: Time and Causation from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.
[13] P. Snow, The emergence of ordered belief from initial ignorance, in: Proc. AAAI-94, Seattle, WA, 1994,
pp. 281–286.
[14] P. Snow, Warranting nondemonstrative reasoning upon the common ground of contending uncertainty
approaches, in: Proc. Information Processing and Management of Uncertainty Conference, 1996, pp. 1381–
1386.
[15] S.K.M. Wong, A logical approach for modeling uncertainty, in: Proc. Information Processing and
Management of Uncertainty Conference, 1996, pp. 129–135.
